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Abstract 
 
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been going through extensive European Unionisation over the last 
10 years the country is still facing serious democratic deficit. In particular, the post-Dayton public sphere has 
been dominated by ethno-nationalist political elites who are doing everything they can to exclude non-
nationalists and members of minority groups from the decision-making process. This is a nagging paradox since 
one of the main objectives behind the integration of the European countries into the European Community was 
to reduce disintegrative and dangerous influences of nationalists to establish peaceful, prosperous, and secure 
community. This article examines how the process of the post-Dayton ethno-nationalization has resulted in  
widespread discrimination against the so-called Others as they are defined in the Constitution. In the post-war 
BiH democratic participation has turned into a competition between the three ethnic communities, Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats, rather than between  individual nationalities  having equal rights of vote. This is why Bosnian 
people are still living under a political system which is closer to ethno-democracy or ethnocracy rather than a 
democratic regime. Under such discriminatory regime BiH cannot enter the European Union which is a model 
of open and democratic society. 
 
Keywords: Dayton Agreement, ethno-nationalism, Europeanisation, European Union,  individual rights, 
minority groups 
 
 
Democracy without minority groups and non-nationalists 
 
Following widespread democratisation processes in Eastern and Central Europe, in November 1990 
the first multi-party elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, Bosnia or BiH). 
These elections were among the first indicator that marked the democratic transition of the country 
from the communist regime to liberal democracy. However, since political parties in the country were 
allowed to be organised along ethnic lines resulting in the nationalist parties together collecting 84% 
of the vote (Arnautović, 2007: 7) the first democratic elections also marked the beginning of the 
political hegemony of nationalist political parties as the majority of the electorate voted for respective 
nationalist parties, that is, Bosniaks voted for the Party of Democratic  Action (SDA), Bosnian Serbs 
for Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and Bosnian Croats for the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 
(Freedom House, 2010: 122). To illustrate, even the post-election distribution of power was based 
upon the ethnic principles so that the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a 
Bosniak, president of the Parliament was a Serb, and the prime minister was a Croat. Furthermore, the 
war that broke out in 1992 further increased ethnic hatreds and intolerance resulting in ethnicity and 
ethnic solidarity as a dominant social and political cleavage.  
In other words, the conflict between the three ethnic groups intensified inter-ethnic polarization 
and massively strengthened the political domination of ethno-nationalist political parties in the 
decision-making processes. What is more, the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995 and brought 
the war to the end, not only created an extremely cumbersome policy process that would frequently 
result in deadlock, it also left unresolved the conflicts that had come to the fore in the 1992-1995 war 
and enshrined the ethno-nationalist principle as the foundation of public discourse (Vogel, 2006: 2). 
While the DPA brought the war to an end and laid the foundation for consolidating peace, many 
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observers also believe that the agreement document reflects wartime circumstances and cannot by 
itself ensure BiH’s future as a functioning and democratic state (Ashdown, 2005). Thus, the post-war 
political and social space has been largely dominated by three ethnic groups leading to institutional 
marginalization of the minority groups.While transition to democracy should bring about participation 
and inclusion of diverse groups into public policy-making the post-war Bosnian public sphere has 
been dominated by ethno-political matrix causing discrimination against minority groups.  
Such a discriminatory political system stands in the way of the country's efforts to enter the 
European Union in the foreseeable future. In fact, by the end of 1990s and in June 2000 through the 
newly initiated Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)  the European Union has paved the way 
for the BiH’s  integration into  the Bloc (Becker, 2008: 20).  Bosnia Herzegovina has singed the 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU in June 2008 signifying its first pre-
accession to eventual EU membership. This is tantamount to the Europeanisation of the BiH’s  
political, economic, administrative and social policy-making (Anastasakis, 2005: 80) and as and other 
structural elements such as political ideologies (identity politics), the legal framework, and the party 
system (Kubicek, 2005:374; Ladrech (1994). However, it is highly debatable if this Europeanisation 
process has influenced the idea of citizenship in Bosnia since minority groups and non-national 
members are alienated both at state and society levels. In fact, widespread ethnic polarisations over 
the public sphere have become the most staggering challenge to the country's journey to Brussels. The 
post-war Bosnia’s  Europeanisation has become closer to the process of ‘Balkanization’ (Todorova, 
1994). This paper  examines how the post-Dayton process of ethno-nationalisation has resulted in  
widespread discrimination against the so-called Others as they are defined in the Constitution. 
 
 
Hegemony of ethno-nationalist elites  
 
More than 15 years since the Dayton Agreement was signed the political tensions are still 
predominant across Bosnia with nationalist leaders challenging the Peace Accord more openly and 
more harshly than ever before. This signifies that in the post-Dayton Bosnia the exclusive ethno-
nationalist approach to politics has managed to gain upper hand over reconciliation and consensus 
(Bianchini, 2000: 79). Thus, BiH is still far from being a functioning democratic state that the accord 
had envisioned. Today, the country still consists of de facto three mono-ethnic territories, three 
education systems and a national government where ethnic identity is the rule of the game. In fact, the 
whole state structure is built according to the ethno-nationalist model. The three majority ethnic 
groups dominate the public discourse in every aspect of life to the exclusion of minorities and non-
nationalists. The best example is the Bosnian rotating presidency which comprises the three Bosniac,  
Croat and Serb, each of whom must be directly elected in their respective entity. This means that the 
Bosnian constitution is treating the non-ethnic members of its community as aliens. Under such 
political regime it is shameful and sometimes even dangerous to declare yourself as a non-nationalist 
or minority member.  
In fact, as stated in the Dayton Agreement the Constitution of BiH prevents candidacy of “others”, 
i.e. the minority groups, to the Presidency and the House of Peoples on the ground of their ethnic 
origins because these positions are preserved for the so-called ‘constituent’ peoples, i.e. Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats. Thus, ethnic groups are represented as communities in different power-sharing 
levels institutionalising ethnic nationalism as a dominant political objective. The hegemony of ethno-
politicians has been perpetuated by the vague and manipulative ideology of “constituent peoples”. As 
a result, minority groups and non-ethnic members of Bosnian society are completely excluded from 
the current power-sharing model. As Touquet and Vermeersch argue: 
“These people have now been excluded from mainstream accounts of the outcomes of 
the recent conflict: it is not possible to be a Yugoslav, a Bosnian or an Eskimo in a 
situation in which ethnic nationalism has transcended all else and in which there are 
intensely localized variations in identity and ‘national’ sentiments” (2008: 280). 
To put it differently, a number of scholars regularly point out that DPA was negotiated by the 
nationalist actors, who actually were one of the main causes of the war, and this  just extended the 
power of the ethic-nationalist parties and their leaders (Kaldor, 1997: 28-30). Bosnian citizens that do 
not belong to the so-called “constituent peoples” were forgotten during the negotiations in Dayton and 
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latter completely excluded from the institutional framework. Thus, the so-called “Others” in the 
Bosnian constitution, namely Jews, Roma and all other national minorities together with those who do 
not declare affiliation with the three ethnic groups have become citizens without institutional space to 
exercise their political and social rights. Given such an unlawful provisions of the Bosnian 
constitution the country has faced deep institutional and constitutional crisis which openly threatened 
democratic participation. With the absence of a genuine multi-national Bosnia the “Others” have been 
marginalized from the public space. 
In fact, the category of “others” and non-nationalists are openly perceived as a threat to the 
power-sharing model of rotation where the three ethnic groups chose their representatives 
respectively. Clearly, the “rotation model” is a form of  political engineering to achieve the objective 
of ethnically-divided Bosnia where democratic participation and competition that prevails in the 
country are only for three ethnic communities rather than for all citizens. All these 17 minority people 
who are categorized as “others”, namely, Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, Jews, 
Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Polls, the Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, 
Slovenians, Turks and Ukrainians (Hammarberg, 2010: 6) are reduced to just playing the role of mere 
spectators during democratic elections. This is how  the post-war hegemony of ethno-nationalists has 
paradoxically increased  democratic deficit in the country.  
 
 
Exclusion of the minority members from the policy-making process 
 
By forbidding minority members the right to run for office Bosnian constitution violates fundamental 
human rights though in 2002 its government ratified the ECHR (European Convention on Human 
Rights) and its Protocols. Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdić who are respectively Jewish and Roma by 
their ethnicity, contested these provisions before the European Court of Human Rights since they 
were banned from running for office. On December 2009 the Court ruled that the exclusion of 
minority groups from Bosnia’s highest elected offices constituted unjustified discrimination. “The 
European Court has made it clear that race-based exclusion from political office has no place in 
Europe," said Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor at HRW (Guardian, 2009). If correctly 
implemented, the decision of the ECHR will assist in breaking down ethnic and religious divisions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by encouraging political participation and representation, and thus 
promoting social cohesion (Claridge, 2010: 2).  
Two years had since passed and the  discriminatory provisions are still yet to be removed from 
the constitution .While most of Europe is going towards multi-national structures Bosnia is still 
pushing for ethno-nationalisation. The Roma problem in the country is the most illustrative case. 
Although in 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Action Plan to Address the Problems of Roma 
in Employment, Housing and Healthcare, this minority group of between 75,000-100,000  is still 
discriminated against with respect to education, employment, health and political representation. 
More than 70 % of Roma do not have a house. According to a 2007 report by UNICEF, up to 80% of 
Roma children in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not attend school, only 20% of Roma had secondary 
education, and less than 1% were in higher education (2007). The proportion of Roma employed 
within the public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina was estimated at 2–3%.Thus, they were 
discriminated against even in terms of basic human rights. 
In the media the Roma are degraded and described as “problematic”, “violent”, “dangerous” etc. 
For instance, when an incident involving Roma happens, their full names are given in sensational 
headlines, even if they are minors, to emphasise their being Roma (Turcilo, 2009). The Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, and his delegation visited Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, from 27 to 30 November 2010 in order to evaluate the living conditions of minority 
groups in BiH. The Delegation noted that the State had excluded the Roma from the country’s  
statistics on living conditions due to prejudice rather than discrimination (2011). The Delegation 
recommends that the Bosnian government intensify efforts to improve the social and economic 
conditions of the Roma community drawing upon the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ 
Recommendation on the Policies for Roma and/or Travellers in Europe (CM, 2008).  
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Institutionalization of ethno-nationalist paradigm  
 
The Bosnian education system has been moblised by the ruling ethno-nationalists to strengthen their 
ethnic hegemony. Ethnic leaders have not demonstrated the necessary political will and commitment 
to establish genuine multi-ethnic schools. Education policies have promoted ethnic segregation. As 
the European Commission pointed out in its 2009 Progress Report for BiH: “Divisions in the 
education system through continuous development of mono-ethnic schools in both entities are still a 
matter of concern and result in de facto segregation of pupils from the very beginning of their 
schooling” (2009). The model of “two schools under one roof” is practiced where children from two 
ethnic groups, Croats and Bosniaks, attend classes in the same building, but physically separated from 
each other and taught separate curriculum. Today, there are 57 such schools in this part of Bosnia. 
Some ethnic politicians oppose integrated multi-ethnic schools on the ground that their people  would 
loose their ethnic identity mixing with others. Ethno-nationalists have used education for the 
systematic indoctrination of their respective ethnic group. Although the OECD stresses in its report 
published in September 2001 that ”education systems should not just be ‘fair’ to minorities – they 
should promote a spirit of equality and tolerance among ethnic and cultural groups” (2001), However, 
in the post-Dayton Bosnia minorities have become “invisible” in an education system bent on 
hammering out ethno-nationalist paradigms. As Perry observes:  
“Let us take a look at language. The official language in the Republika Srpska is 
Serbian, and in the Federation the official languages are Bosnian or Croatian, 
depending on the canton. The ‘others’ learn the language that is dominant in their 
particular surrounding. It is worth stressing that we have three official languages in 
one country. ‘Others’ have been assimilated into an official language, but only the 
language of their specific territory, which in my opinion is not in accordance with 
their human rights” (2002: 27)   
Probably marginalization of minority groups has to do with the fact that the main objective of the 
Dayton negotiations was peace rather than equality, hence the discrimination against non-nationalist 
groups. As the European Court of Human Rights concludes in their ruling concerning the Sejdic-Finci 
case:  
“a very fragile cease-fire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed 
to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The nature of the 
conflict was such that the approval of the ‘constituent peoples’ … was necessary to 
ensure peace. This could explain, without necessarily justifying, the absence of 
representatives of other communities … at the peace negotiations and the 
participants’ preoccupation with effective equality between the ‘constituent peoples’ 
in the post-conflict society” (2009: 34). 
As a result, BiH has become a bi-cameral legislature where the three so-called “constituent 
peoples”, Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, are represented in parity (5:5:5) in the second chamber, the 
House of Peoples (Marko, 2005: 6). The state presidency and the ministries  are composed according 
to this consociationalist ethnic power-sharing (Lipjhart, 1994), a form of power-sharing which main 
purpose is reconciliation of diverse social preferences along ethnic and religious lines (Schneckener 
2002: 203-206). In other words, Dayton Agreement has resulted in an institutional framework in 
which the largest three ethnic groups are officially recognised  as legitimate power holders and  
decision-makers enjoying the same right of veto when their respective “vital national rights” are 
endangered (Bieber, 2004). However,  consociationalist model of power-sharing in Bosnia has not 
bring about necessary democratic transformation and reconciliation even after the 15 years of 
transition period as it  completely excluded minority members and non-nationalists from the decision-
making process.  
 
 
Institutional engineering that kills the idea of citizenship  
 
Post-war power-sharing in Bosnia has privileged the constituent ethnic groups in order to bring peace 
and stability among warring factions (Grofman & Stockwell 2003) but weak performance of 
democracy and ethnic tolerance under the current rules reveals the limits of such institutional 
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engineering (Manning & Antić 2003, 55-56). It has resulted in a political concept that was 
counterproductive and amplified  ethnic tensions among warring groups. As Prof. Zarije Seizovic 
points out: “The “ethnic criteria” introduced in the Preamble of the Constitution of BiH (being 
reinforced in number of places in its normative part) prevents BiH authorities from sharing power 
equally within the civil society, favouring ethnic groups to the detriment of the individual citizen” 
(2007: 2). The  power-sharing model has been interpreted in essentialist and absolutist terms by ethnic 
groups.  
To be sure, the Constitution of BiH does recognise basic human rights and protection of minority 
groups and requires the State to ensure the highest level of internationally recognised human rights 
and freedom from discrimination (Art. II 4). Yet, in practice  not all the country's citizens enjoy these  
fundamental rights. This means that  the current BiH constitutional order was unsuccessful from the 
very outset (Seizovic, 2007: 2). As Sarajlic points out:  
“In addition to the malaise of postsocialist transition, shared by all the Yugoslavian 
successor states, the existing Bosnian citizenship regime has been strongly influenced 
by a heritage of ethnic conflict and the provisional constitutional set-up of the 
country, ... the conceptualization of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
dependent on the definition of the community of citizens who constitute the state. 
Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a nation-state (and has never been one) but a 
federal union based on the sovereignty of ethnic groups which have political 
supremacy over individuals, making clear-cut assumptions and definitions of Bosnian 
citizenship is close to impossible (2010: 2).  
This is  why it has become almost illogical to talk in terms of the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since more than half of the country's population still think and feel as Serbs, Croats, or 
Bosniaks more than as Bosnians. The  BiH political discourse has become limited and even restrictive 
for the members perceiving themselves as Yugoslavs, Bosnians, Romas, Jews, and so forth. In that 
regard, Prof. Atajic points out that “Everything – from the greeting you use to the dialect you speak 
and the newspaper in your coat pocket – is judged, commented upon and categorized in terms of an 
omnipresent, mysticised ‘ethnicity’. Under such circumstances, defining oneself as a citizen of the 
BiH state is tantamount to a betrayal of one’s national identity” (2002:118).  
In fact, by vast majority of people in Bosnia ethnicity is perceived as a religious dogma that must 
be respected. Such situation has impacted negatively on the development of common sense of 
belonging and Bosnian citizenship. The absurdity of it all is that even those citizens who are truly 
Bosnians (as distinguished from being Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats) constitute a minority in BiH 
(Turcilo, 2009: 1).  
 
 
“Vital national interest” as a rule of the game 
 
Pervasive institutionalisation of ethno-nationalist politics in the post-Dayton Bosnia has been realised 
through structural framework where ethnic rights are safeguarded on the basis of the so-called “vital 
national interest” (VNI). In this regard, the representatives in the House of Peoples of BiH has a right 
to block a law if it is against the VNI of their respective community. Similarly, the tripartite state 
presidency has the power of veto on legislative decisions if  a threat to the vital interests of their 
‘nations’ is perceived. The problem with all this is that the notion of the VNI in the Bosnian case is 
usually interpreted simplistically as ‘ethnic’ interest (Mujkic, 2007). This is why the principle of VNI 
is highly discriminatory against minority groups and non-nationalists since they do not have a right to 
use veto. Simply put, widespread politicisation of ethnicity and the success of ethnically-oriented 
political parties are serious obstacles to the long-term democratisation process (Chandler, 2000: 111) 
in the country. 
The main agenda behind the vital national interest was really to ensure the ethnic rights of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s “constituent peoples”, i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. State and Entity 
constitutions establish blocking mechanisms to protect the "vital interests" of these constituent 
peoples (EC, 2005: 9). The effect of this alienation of the non- constituent peoples is to further slow 
down legislative process of the country entry into the Euro-Atlantic union. It has impaired the quality 
of Bosnian democracy where citizens are represented only as members of one of the three constituent 
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peoples, placing ethnic representation before general interest and making “ (ethnic) nations rather 
than citizens the bearers of all rights” (Katana & Igric, 2005). As stated in the report of the USAID 
(2007: 6), “Bosnia’s constitution enshrines the “vital national interests” of the constituent peoples and 
in doing so guarantees both political inclusion and exclusion by ethnicity... Bosnians filter public 
discourse by ethnicity, including as valid their group’s views, excluding as invalid the views of other 
groups. The public square is available to all – one opinion, one voice and one group at a time”.  
 
 
With democratic deficit towards Brussels!  
 
Bosnian social context has been dominated by the idea of Volksgemeinshaft or the people's 
community rather than community of free individuals. In this manner,  Živanović highlights the post-
war political constellations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as following: “Here, we do not live as human 
beings but as Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs” (2005). In fact, the post-Dayton regime has dehumanised 
the public space in Bosnia.  Today’s Bosnia resembles  a kind of “illiberal democracy” as where free 
elections take place without the provision of basic human rights and freedoms (Zakaria, 1997). Thus, 
post-war Bosnian political regime represents a kind of ethnocracy rather than a truly democratic 
system as it is a regime that facilitates “the expansion, ethnicization and control of contested territory 
and state by a dominant ethnic nation” (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004: 649). In fact, extreme 
prioritization of ethnic values over individual principles has made it threatening to democracy. As 
Mujkic points out:  
“I call a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group(s) over 
the individual that is implemented through democratic self-legislation, and a 
community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group’s right to self-
determination over the citizen’s right to self-determination where the citizen’s 
membership in a political community is determined by her or his membership in 
ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And I call the political narrative and practice intended 
to justify this ethnically-based social construct, ethnopolitics” (2007: 116). 
Clearly, the  protection of the  rights of minority groups has not been incorporated into Bosnia’s 
legal framework although  the Venice Commission proposed in March 2005 a  range of  constitutional 
reforms that are necessary to prepare Bosnia and Herzegovina for the  future EU membership. These 
stipulate transfer of competencies from the entities to the state, reform of inefficient state legislative 
and executive structures, elimination of “prerogatives for ethnic or group rights, strengthening 
citizens’ rights, and clarification of the entities’ future relationship to the state (Joseph & Hitchner, 
2008: 5).  
The Venice Commission also summarizes that Bosnian integration into the EU is under threat 
since its institutional framework is in direct breach of ECHR stated rules highlighting “the existence 
of tensions between a constitutional system based on collective equality of ethnic groups on one hand, 
and the principle of individual rights and equality of citizens on the other.” (2005: 17).  
In this regard, the Venice Commission (2005: 12) highlights that:  
First of all, the interests of persons not belonging to the three constituent peoples risk 
being neglected or people are forced to artificially identify with one of the three 
peoples although they may, for example, be of mixed origin or belong to a different 
category. Each individual is free to change his political party affiliation. By contrast, 
ethnic identity is far more permanent, and individuals will not be willing to vote for 
parties perceived as representing the interest of a different ethnic group, even if these 
parties provide better and more efficient government. A system favoring and 
enshrining a party system based on ethnicity therefore seems flawed.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the product of formerly communist countries which became democracies 
in the aftermath of turbulent disintegration of Yugoslavia in early 1990s. While  democratic transition 
is expected to bring about incorporation of diverse groups into policy-making the post-war Bosnian 
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public sphere has been dominated by ethno-nationalists resulting in wholesale discrimination against 
minority groups and those self-declared non-nationalists. Going by the Copenhagen political criteria 
which require applicant countries to achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” the BiH as of today is still in 
serious democratic deficit. The BiH cannot enter the EU while its public sphere is extremely fractured 
and dominated by ethno-nationalist elites that prevent the development of a truly open and democratic 
society. The BiH politicians, media, civil society and other pro-EU societal actors must make extra 
efforts to include diverse societal groups, including minority members and non-nationalists, into the 
decision-making process to make them a part of country's  decade-long deadlock solution. 
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